PrepCom Review Conference
2004 - 2005
Ban The Bomb or Risk Self Destruction
Can United Nations and International Community Meet The Challenge?
[A fresh look at the tasks facing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Prep-com 2004, review conference 2005 in New York and suggestions of actions and initiatives for accelerated moves towards nuclear disarmament]
1 Challenges facing the NPT El Baradei Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency
The spread of nuclear technology and knowledge is out of the tube and we won't be able to put it back. The proliferation is on the rise and nuclear secrets and kits have been sold over the counter by the Pakistani rogue scientist Abdul Qadeer Kahn since the 1970's. We are not sure that besides Korea, Libya and Iran who else has the technology to blow us all out of extinction. The present development of new nuclear weapons, missile defences and plans to weaponise outer space by US is adding to the spread of nuclear proliferation.
Mohamed El Baradei Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency wrote in a article in New York Times that: "Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programmes. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology,,if not actual weapons."
If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction.
Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the non proliferation regime.
The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, for lesson the risk of nuclear non proliferation. The current system relies on a gentleman's agreement that is not only non binding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise. .
We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.
In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended and rightly so in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of Non Proliferation Treaty obligation requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 per cent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. It should be in force far all countries. In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months' notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.
This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council. The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users. Towards this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.
Of course, a fundamental part of the non proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the Non Proliferation Treaty Britain, China, France, Russia and the United Statesto move towards disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the Non Proliferation Treaty review conference next year. We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of long-standing conflict like West Asia, South Asia and the 'Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction while never justified can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security and indeed to continue to refine their .capacities and postulate plans for their use. Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place."
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New York Times
Editorial, February 16
"The initiatives set forth last week were all timely and useful and deserve international support. But they do not go far enough."President George Bush called for tighter export controls by the leading nuclear supplier nations, strengthened intelligence and law enforcement against rogue proliferators, and expanded efforts to eliminate or secure nuclear bomb fuel left over from abandoned weapons programmes. What he failed to do was put America's weight behind a sustained effort to revise and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT ) and persuade the handful of countries (India, Pakistan,Israel and North Korea outside the treaty to join. Also disappointing was his failure to propose increased American financing for the expanded bomb fuel elimination programme
"Mr Bush refuses to recognise that established nuclear powers like the United States undermine anti-proliferation efforts when they talk about developing new nuclear weapons for possible use against non-nuclear states."
Editorial, February 16
"Mr Bush's... speech to the National Defense University ... left some key questions unanswered...
"One of Mr Bush's proposals is to expand the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1991 meant to pay for the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the employment of weapons scientists in the dissolved Soviet Union to other countries, such as Libya... Mr Bush, however, cut the funding for the current Nunn-Lugar programme in the budget he submitted to Congress ...Cooperation to halt nuclear proliferation means that all states have to devalue nuclear weapons. So Mr Bush should terminate his $3bn [£1.6bn] programme to develop small bunker-busting nuclear weapons."
Editorial, February 13
"The appalling example of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who masterminded Pakistan's bomb and then, with despicable greed, sold the secrets to other rogue regimes, underlines the dangers of perverted technicians willing to merchandise mass destruction..."International efforts and treaties to stop the spread of such weapons are failing, and the world must join forces to criminalise nuclear trafficking and plug the loopholes in the enforcement system. The proposals... go to the heart of the matter. There is no justification for anyone to sell equipment to a country seeking to enrich or reprocess nuclear fuel for the first time. Iran has shown that civilian nuclear programmes can easily mask a determination to make weapons... Mr Bush has moved more swiftly and more deftly on the proliferation threat than his critics will admit."
Editorial, Singapore, February 16
"Mr Bush's decision some years ago not to sign the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, as well as his recent decision to develop a new class of battlefield nuclear weapons, will not augment US credibility on proliferation issues. Washington cannot \vith its left hand interdict proliferation networks like Dr Khan's, and, with its right, refurbish and expand its own nuclear arsenal... The feasibility of Mr Bush's plan depends crucially on international cooperation, which he is not 1 going to get unless he pursues a multilateral foreign policy."
Editorial, February 16
"The failure of the nuclear weapons states to live up to their part of the NPT fatally undermines the entire non-proliferation regime. As long as they cling to their arsenals and continue to update and modernise them they reinforce the notion that such weapons have utility and are worth pursuing. Moreover, their inaction confirms the belief that the NPT is a hypocritical agreement that perpetuates nuclear apartheid. That mentality erodes the legitimacy of the NPT and under scores Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament."
Editorial, February 15
"Iran has neither stopped developing a bomb nor lying about its nuclear programme ... Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] announced that it has discovered plans for a P2 uranium enrichment facility ... Part of the problem here is a loophole in the non-proliferation regime that Iran is playing to the hilt. That regime does not prohibit members from enriching uranium... Mr Bush proposed closing precisely this loophole... This standard should be employed in the case of Iran immediately, outside of any timetable for renegotiating the non-proliferation regime as a whole."
"Mr Bush... has learnt from the past year. A year ago his officials were busy disparaging the IAEA for the failure of its inspectors to find a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Now that the US acknowledges there was no such failure because there was no such programme, Mr Bush has chosen to bolster the IAEA ... "But the civil nuclear industry will have to subsume its own interests to the greater good. However much the world needs nuclear power, especially as a carbon-free source of energy to help stem climate change, it has an even more immediate interest in stemming the spread of atomic bombs. And Mr Bush's proposals make a useful contribution to that goal."
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Nuclear powers and disarmament
From Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat FRS (President Emeritus of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs), and Professor Robert A. Hinde FRS (Chairman of the British Pugwash Group, The Times 13th of February 2004
Sir, Your call for the world to "act to halt nuclear proliferation" (leading article, February 13) is timely and urgent.
You rightly praise the proposals from President George W. Bush to curb the acquisition of nuclear materials by some countries, but you do not comment on the fundamental aspect of the problem.
Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that the onus is on the established nuclear powers to lead the way in nuclear disarmament You described this as unhelpful, but it is the case. As long as some states, including the most powerful one, believe that their security demands the possession of nuclear weapons, how can we deny such security to other states which consider themselves to be vulnerable?
Again you rightly say that "the yardstick by which a country will be judged will be not only democracy and human rights, but adherence to nuclear pledges and protocols". The relevant treaty is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which all five nuclear powers, ie, the US, Russia, France, China and the UK, have signed and ratified. In mentioning the NPT in his speech, President Bush appears to note one aspect of it: to
prevent new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons; however, under Article VI of the NPT, the existing nuclear powers committed themselves to proceed, in good faith, to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This commitment was reaffirmed "unequivocally" at the NPT Review Conference in 2000.
The elimination of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a safeguard regime to prevent the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons, present extremely difficult problems, but they will never be solved unless an effort is made to tackle them. The body set up to do this, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, is prevented from doing its job by the continued refusal by the nuclear powers to put it on its agenda.
Unless this issue is given high priority it is inevitable that other nations will seek security in keeping or acquiring nuclear weapons and eventually terrorist groups too will acquire nuclear weapons.
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UN NUCLEAR WATCHDOG CALLS FOR TOUGHER NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
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Role of UN
During its nearly 60 years of existence UN through its work comprising more then two dozen organizations has some remarkable successes to its credit in peacekeeping operations. It has helped people rebuild countries from ruins of war. UN has maintained peace and order in such diverse places as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Cyprus and Kashmir, over 30 years in difficult circumstances.
The primary function of United Nations and central part of its mandate for which it was established is to maintain International Peace and Security as is enshrined in its charter. It full fills that function through its various agencies i.e. UN peace keeping operations, office of Disarmament affairs, conference on Disarmament (CD), The International Atomic Agency (IAEA). These agencies have the responsibility of general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of International Peace and Security, including the principles governing disarmament treaties and regulation of armaments. Some of UN achievements have been the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT), Anti-Personnel Landmine treaty 1997, the chemical weapons convention 1992, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1996 and many multilateral and bilateral agreements including creation of nuclear weapon free zones. The IAEA plays a prominent role in peaceful uses of atomic energy and at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by its International Inspectorate team and its verification measures.
General and complete disarmament or gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction is one of the goals set by the United Nations. Its immediate objectives are to eliminate the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, and to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race.
The UN Disarmament machinery works in New York and Geneva through General Assembly First Committee, Disarmament commission, conference on Disarmament and Department for Disarmament all playing pivotal role in preparatory committee and review conferences of NPT. IAEA supervises peaceful uses of nuclear energy and controls spread of nuclear proliferation.
The Weapons of Mass Destruction is the branch of Department for Disarmament Affairs and provides substantive support for the activities of the United Nations in the area of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), including the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorist acts, as well as missiles. The Branch follows closely all developments and trends with regard to weapons of mass destruction in all their aspects in order to keep the Secretary-General fully informed and to provide information to Member States and the international community. The Branch supports, and participates in, multilateral efforts to strengthen the international norm on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, in this connection, it cooperates with relevant intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom).
The main players in the Arms control and Disarmament issues are Intergovernmental Organisations, the Diplomatic Disarmament community and Governmental Ministries. These work along NGO's and Civil society. There is intense activity of different types that is conferences, fringe meetings and research projects, along with the daily meetings of the Disarmament committee. They all trying to influence the outcome of the NPT.
On the subject of research, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) deserves a special mention. The Institutes activities transcend diverse perspectives: from global diplomacy to regional and local dimensions, and from the human focus to the international outlook. This breadth of scope has led the group to branch out its activities into three areas: global security and disarmament, regional security and disarmament and human security and disarmament. Global security and disarmament covers international arms control agreements and their implementation as well as questions on international security, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Regional security and disarmament develops themes linked to conflict concentrated in specific areas of the globe, such as promoting civil society participation in West African disarmament dialogues. Finally, human security and disarmament explores the complex interrelations between disarmament, human rights and development. Anti-personnel mines, small arms and peace-building issues feature prominently in this area.
However the recent exposure of proliferation in Pakistan, Lybia and Iran is a challenge for United Nations and the International Community who need to see that non nuclear states do not acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction by having access to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. A complete transparency and accountability need to be maintained in the present frightening political climate for the progress in non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass Destruction can take place which will minimise the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
We need to examine the role of members states of United Nations to see why after agreeing to the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they are not abiding by it. The Nuclear Weapon States regard disarmament as a non-issue and they feel no obligation to go forward in implementing the legally binding goals of NPT. Its a case of more promises and no intention to honour them.
NPT is still the corner stone and the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of general and total disarmament by nuclear-weapons states. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. 188 states have joined the NPT, including the five Nuclear-Weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms disarmament agreement. The NPT is essentially a nuclear disarmament treaty. Its central pillar, Article VI, obliges its signatories "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". The International Court of Justice has stated unequivocally that the achievement of global nuclear disarmament is a legal obligation on all states.
Every five years the NPT states meet for a Review Conference. The next one will take place in May 2005. In the intervening years there are Preparatory Committee Meetings (PrepComs). The next PrepCom will be in Spring 2004.
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NPT and Role of International Community
(Initiatives, events, campaigns and actions)
There are 100's of initiatives around the world to ban nuclear weapons and for the successful implementation of NPT. Here are a few of them
a) This is the first in a series of regular updates from Reaching Critical Will on the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in
New York on April 26- May 7, 2004.
In this NPT News Advisory:
1. Invitation to the 2004 NPT PrepCom
2. NGO Registration
3. What can we hope to achieve?
4. NGO Statements to the delegates
5. Housing Options for NGO representatives
6. News in Review: the daily NGO newsletter
7.What can I do if I can't go to New York?
8. Women's Caucus at the NPT
9. Links for more information
Reaching Critical Will has recently updated and re-organized NPT page at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nptindex1.html, which contains all official documents from past NPT meetings, background on the treaty and the issues at stake in 2004, NGO analysis, reports, and presentations to the PrepCom and more.
General E-News Advisory
April 7, 2004
This news advisory includes brief updates on various international disarmament machinery, including:
1) The United Nations Disarmament Commission Postpones 2004 Session
2) NGOs and the Security Council Draft Resolution on Non-Proliferation
3) New Conference on Disarmament resource from Reaching Critical Will
4) "Contextualizing the NPT," a Report for Non-Nuclear Weapon States Party to the NPT
5) NGO Morning Strategy Sessions at the NPT Rescheduled
As always, we welcome your comments, questions, or concerns. This and all other news advisories are archived on our site.
1) The UNDC Postpones 2004 Session
On Monday, April 5, the United Nations Disarmament Commission convened in New York, as scheduled. Yet despite months of diplomatic wrangling over the substantive agenda items, the major players- the US, the UK, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)- remain deadlocked and the session is now postponed.
In his opening statement as Chair, Georgia's Ambassador Revaz Adamia urged Members to "seek inspiration" from past achievements of the Commission, such as Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and conventional arms control measures. He stressed the need for revitalized efforts in the face of new challenges to the international disarmament regime, including "new concepts of deadly weaponry," threats of terrorism, and "the readiness or willingness of some Member States to comply" with existing obligations.
Under-Secretary-General Nobuyasu Abe, too, delivered a short intervention, in which he reminded States that "the work of this Commission has been shaped by the political will of its members" and called for "increased joint efforts to strengthen the multilateral system of international peace and security."
Ms. Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland, was elected Vice-Chair of the Commission.
The First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I), provided the mandate for the United Nations Disarmament Commission as the world's only universal forum for deliberating substantive disarmament issues. Years later, it was decided that the UNDC would focus only on a few substantive issues over a three year cycle, in order to facilitate in-depth discussions on these matters most important to international peace and security. The Commission is then to make consensus-based recommendations to the General Assembly.
In 2000, the Commission adopted an agenda that covered 1) Nuclear disarmament; and 2) Confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Completely divided on the issues, Member States chose to postpone the 2002 session, in order to provide more time for reaching consensus. By the close of the third and final year of this cycle, the UNDC adjourned in 2003 without having reached consensus.
For the 2004 session, the NAM States wished to continue deliberations on the two previous items. The United States, which drafted a 2003 GA resolution (58/126) on the issue of First Committee reform, wished for the Commission to deliberate the non-substantive issue of UNDC reform. Finally, the United Kingdom, a bit less adamantly, proposed an agenda that would cover nuclear verification and best practices in SALW.
Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the NAM, stated that they "remain hopeful" that continued deliberations will result in the agreement on agenda items that take into consideration the concerns of all delegations. Both the UK and the US refrained from making an official statement to the Commission.
The informal consultations on the agenda continued immediately after the Chair suspended the session on Monday and will continue throughout the three few weeks.
2) NGOs and the Security Council Draft Resolution on Nonproliferation
After months of intensive debate amongst the P5, a new draft resolution on
nonproliferation was made public on March 24. The draft resolution, as it
currently stands, fails to acknowledge the indivisible relationship between
non-proliferation and disarmament. If this resolution is passed as is, it would further
contribute to the dangerous de-linkage between these two, incontrovertibly interdependent
NGOs based in New York sent a memorandum, along with recommendations for draft language on the resolution, to the Security Council and other states, emphasizing the need for full consultation with all interested states, and with civil society, including through an open session and an informal ("Arria formula") civil society briefing.
Abolition 2000, a network of over 2000 disarmament NGOs, is conducting a major grassroots mobilization, urging civil society to contact the Security Council and their Ministries of Foreign Affairs to demand an open session of the Security Council as they debate this unprecedented SC resolution.
Click here to read the letter of appeal that was sent out by the Abolition Global Council, the International Steering Committee of Abolition 2000.
Click here to read the article from the UN Wire.
here to read the statements delivered by John Burroughs
Snyder at the UN Correspondents Association Press Club Press Briefing on March 31,
For more information, contact either Susi Snyder, WILPF UN Director, or John Burroughs, Executive Director of Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy.
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3) New CD Resource from Reaching Critical Will
Now that the Conference on Disarmament has adjourned its first session of 2004, we have compiled a Summary of Statements by Topic, that is now available on our website.
This resource makes it easy for CD watchers to see where each State stands on the pertinent issue facing the Geneva body. We have listed every reference by Member States made to the following topics:
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Subsidiary Body on Nuclear Disarmament
Negative Security Assurances
This list will be updated at the close of each session. We hope this will prove to be a useful resource.
While the CD takes a break, be sure to stay updated with other disarmament fora by subscribing to RCW's other email news services, including the News in Review, the daily newsletter published during the NPT. Subscribe today by sending an email to: firstname.lastname@example.org. To receive the weekly reports on the CD, send an email to: email@example.com, or check out the archived updates. For a full description of all of RCW's email services, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/action/listindex.html.
4) "Contextualizing the NPT," a Report for Non-Nuclear Weapon States Party to the NPT
In collaboration with the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Western States' Legal Foundation, Reaching Critical Will has published a report, "Contextualizing the NPT," in preparation for the NPT PrepCom, April 26- May 7. The report, which outlines various challenges facing the treaty and recommends ways of moving forward on key issues, is available in PDF and with an accompanying PowerPoint presentation. Both are available on the web for a limited time.
5) NGO Morning Strategy Session Re-Scheduled
Throughout the PrepCom, the Abolition 2000 network will be holding a daily Strategy Session for NGOs at 8 AM, in the Grumman Room 10th floor, of the UNCC at 777 UN Plaza. Following each day's strategy session, we will be reconvening at 9 AM in Conference Room A for a briefing by delegates at the PrepCom.
For more information on these strategy sessions, contact Emma McGregor-Mento, the Abolition 2000 coordinator.
For a full listing of all of the events planned for this year's PrepCom, see the Events Calendar, also available in a printable format.
Reaching Critical Will
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b) NGO Committee on Disarmament in Geneva
International Peace Bureau with other International NGO's join together for keeping the nuclear bargain and full spectrum compliance with the NPT.
Its aim, purpose and themes are as follows:
To identify areas for future action by all players
Our aim is to link the issue of compliance by both Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The future of the Treaty is under threat from proliferation in at least three regions, while at the same time its most powerful state parties are conducting a form of unilateral policing -- by threatening 'pre-emptive' strikes against the proliferators while developing a new generation of nuclear weaponry themselves. The topic offers an opportunity to explore in more depth the type of proposals that were made during the first two 'In Defence of the NPT' workshops, organised by the Committee earlier this year. These proposals also include efforts to tackle the impasse in the CD.
IPB Website: www.ipb.org
A CALL FOR GLOBAL RESISTANCE ON MARCH 20
This is an ideal opportunity for supporters of NPT to go to the march with banners of ban the bomb and tell the world and their Governments that they should get rid of Weapons of Mass Destruction and comply with the NPT Treaty Obligations to which they have signed.
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it is an a emergency campaign to ban nuclear weapons by 2020
The 2020 Campaign intends to:
1. Mobilize at least 500 NGO representatives to attend the PrepCom 2004 and 1000 for 2005 review conference, and lead the lobbying effort in pursuit of nuclear abolition.
2. Mobilize at least a dozen mayors of major cities to attend the 2004 PrepCom and 100 mayors assist the NGO lobbying effort.
3. Organize thousands to be in New York during the conference for a mass street demonstration on May 1 and massive media outreach to express the will of the people.
4. Encourage all supporting mayors and NGO representatives to begin lobbying national governments at every opportunity.
Mayors for Peace: http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/mayors/
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d) Global Public Opinion
Peace movements are planing a large demonstration May 1st at the same time of PrepCom 2004 and hope to mobilise 1 million people to be in central park and streets of New York during the review conference 2005 to express the will of the people. An informed and active Global Public Opinion remains the most potent force available in this great struggle. Whatever the political structures of a country, politicians do have to listen to what the people are saying. Public opinion as an increasingly active force remain the best hope for the future.
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e) Nuclear Awareness Project
it is a project to explore the general public's awareness and understanding of the nuclear weapons issue. The report conducted by Pugwash, Greenpeace and supported by INLAP has important information highlights of which are as follows:
In order to explore the general publics awareness and understanding of the nuclear weapons issue, the Nuclear Weapons Awareness Project worked through Topline to carry out public opinion research in April 2003 during the period of the Iraq War.
The results of focus group discussions, along with research into previous surveys on the issue of public opinion and nuclear weapons provided the following important information:
The overall awareness and knowledge of basic nuclear weapons issues was higher among men who were in general opposed to disarmament, whereas women and younger people were less informed and less defined in their opinions, but more receptive to arguments for nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear weapons were primarily perceived to be bombs that caused huge destruction. None had heard of the term mini-nukes but understood them to mean smaller weapons that were less destructive and had an effect on a smaller area. Initially, this made some feel reassured that they were less awful than current nuclear weapons but on reflection they felt that they were worse because it would be easier for countries to justify using them.
There was a general perception that the threat of nuclear war had receded after the end of the Cold War. Anti-nuclear weapons campaigns were felt to also have receded into the background.
There was a perception that the world had changed after September 11, and that the threat (nuclear or otherwise) from terrorists and rogue states was now much greater.
There was a strong perception that there was a new threat in the world after Sept 11, now reinforced by the conflict in Iraq. Although nuclear weapons were mentioned as part of the Iraq conflict (blurred with chemical/biological weapons) these were not felt to be a direct threat to the UK. However, there were concerns that it might become so. This new threat was perceived to be a considerable change from the days of the Cold War with Russia and America in deadlock. Respondents over 30, especially over 50, were highly aware of this change.
There was a feeling that the general publics voice was not listened to. For example the marches against the war that some of the respondents supported had made no impact on the decision to go to war with Iraq.
Respondents perceived a breakdown in unity of international collaborative institutions such as the UN and EU and a lack of power and influence against the autonomous actions of a maverick USA which had initiated the Iraq conflict against the wishes of the world. The general view was that America would do what it wanted, the UK would follow and the rest of the world would be powerless to change this. There was felt to be a lack of trust and hope in the world at the moment to make changes for the better in areas such as nuclear disarmament.
People were surprised at the small number of states that did possess nuclear weapons, and were not very aware of the major treaties (NPT, CTBT, ABM) to control proliferation. A small minority of respondents were able to cite the full list of nuclear countries. The majority were able to cite: Russia, America, the UK, France and possibly China as these were perceived to be major powers. Others mentioned were North Korea, Pakistan and India. Iraq was also mentioned in the context of the current crisis. When prompted with a list of nuclear weapon states respondents were surprised by the presence of Israel and also the high numbers of nuclear weapons held. This was felt to be very high in comparison to the amount of damage just one bomb could do.
There was very limited awareness of the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However,there was recollection that the US and Russia had agreed to some disarmament but no-one knew if this had actually happened.
The majority saw a future with more nuclear weapons not less - with new and more dangerous countries obtaining them. This was felt to be in order to be on a par with the superpowers and to threaten them.
On prompting with a list of countries who had decided not to follow their nuclear programmes or had dismantled them. The response among many was positive and offered hope but the more skeptical men stated that these countries were not major world players.
On discussing whether global nuclear disarmament was possible, most felt the following elements had to be in place:
the right world leaders ready to take the initiative;
trust and hope;
most countries acting together.
There was a willingness to consider a nuclear weapons-free Europe but unilateral nuclear disarmament by the UK was for the most part dismissed as an unfeasible option.
The major barrier to people's support of nuclear disarmament was the climate of fear and instability with the ever present threat of rogue states (including the US) and terrorists, and the loose technology floating around.
The major driver towards a nuclear weapons-free world was the idea of it as an epic challenge for the human race in the 21st century to prevent our species from self destruction.
Public opinion on specific issues relating to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons was much more positive and malleable than on the issue of overall nuclear disarmament.
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f) Abolition 2000 and Abolition 2000 Europe (Anglo-French initiative)
Abolition 2000, a network of over 2000 disarmament NGOs, is conducting a major grassroots mobilization, urging civil society to contact the Security Council and their Ministries of Foreign Affairs to demand an open session of the Security Council as they debate this unprecedented SC resolution. It is a coalition of European NGO's committed to global Abolition of nuclear weapons. It aims to educate and enlist the help of members of European Parliament (MEP's) to consider what could be done on a European level to further full implementation of NPT and Europe's participation in review conference of NPT of 2005.
Abolition 2000 Network http://www.abolition2000.org/, www.gn.apc.2000uk
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g) Aldermaston 2004 London to Aldermaston March 9-12 April
AWE Aldermaston already builds and maintains Britain's nuclear warheads for four Trident submarines and over 50 years of radioactive discharges have left a legacy of cancer-causing plutonium and uranium in the environment.
In 1958 people marched to Aldermatson because of the fear of nuclear war. That fear is still here. In 2004 we march to put pressure the government to stop new developments at Aldermaston, to withdraw support from the US unlawful policy of pre-emptive wars and stop to comply with the NPT.
CND website: www.cnduk.org
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h) Barcelona Forum 2004
A Dialogue for people who want peace
From June 23 to 27,2004, Forum Barcelona 2004, the Peace Foundation and the International Peace Bureau host the Dialogue "Towards a World Without Violence", a space at the service of individuals, groups and movements working for peace around the world.
The gathering aims to be the largest international congress organized by the peace movement since the Hague Conference of 1999. Don't let it pass you by!
Towards a World Without Violence
Violence, in the many forms that it takes, is all too present in our world. It generates suffering now and leads inevitably to more violence in the future.
Building a world free of violence is a formidable challenge and must be a top priority for governments, social movements and individuals. This Dialogue seeks to draw together ideas and generate proposals that will make such a world possible.
Five key themes
A range of formats-including meetings, round tables, seminars, cultural events,
interviews and dialogue-will be used to take a closer look at the following issues:
Moving from an analysis of the causes and contexts of conflict to an exploration of nonviolent approaches to control and transformation. The experience of those pursuing peace in violent contexts will play a central role in this process.
Wars don't just happen: there are a series of factors that facilitate military conflict (including the arms trade and the influence of the military industry). The advocates of peace must be aware of these factors and know how to respond to them.
Light arms, weapons of mass destruction, antipersonnel mines... All perpetuate the same insecurity. An ambitious agenda needs to be developed to monitor, reduce and eliminate these threats.
4.Extending peace education programs throughout the world
All institutions involved in generating values (including schools, non formal education and the media) have a crucial role to play in overcoming the culture of violence and establishing a peace culture
5. The concept of human security
Which concept of security and as defined by which set of priorities? How do such choices contribute to shaping our world? Moving from military defense towards human security.
International Peace Bureau (IPB): www.ipb.org
Fundacio per la Pau: www.fundacioperlapau.org
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i) Declaration for a Nuclear free World
The idea for this project is for individuals to sign for a Declaration for a Nuclear Free World. These Declarations will be prominently displayed in New York in 2005 when the world leaders gather at United Nations to review their treaty obligations. For further details see:
World Court Project: www.gn.apc.org/wcp
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j) A Treaties Day School
The school helps in lobbying at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty preparatory in 2004 and the review conference in 2005, as well as the lobby of Parliament organised by United Nations Association.
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k) Staying at home in UK or your country how can you help with the NPT negotiations
The following resources are available at the CND website to launch a "No New Nukes" programme to raise public awareness about NPT issue and put pressure on the government.
a) No New Nukes - Campaign Briefing
b) Attracting local media Press Briefing 1
c) Writing a press release Press Briefing 2
d) Interviewing technique Press Briefing 3
e) How to lobby your MP Parliamentary Briefing
f) Nuclear Circus Comes to Townville Press Release, photo opportunity
CND Website: http://www.cnduk.org
we need to work on the following long term goals
a) A global system to abolish war and strengthen peaceful means of conflict resolution
Movement of Abolition of War website: http://www.abolishwar.freeuk.com
b) Global spread of education for peacemaking and peace building
Hague Agenda for Peace website: http://www.haguepeace.org
Amnesty International website: http://www.amnesty.org
INLAP website: www.gn.apc.org/inlap
One World Trust website: http://www.oneworldtrust.org
United Nations -- www.un.org
Action for UN Renewal website: http://www.action-for-un-renewal.org.uk
§United Nations Association UK: www.una-uk.org
1. Nuclear free local authorities
2. Citizens inspection of the nuclear facilities and installations
Information from www.cnduk.org
Nuclear Weapons are dangerous. If we depend on nuclear weapons we are the most likely victims of our own capability and higher on the terrorists' target list. We should stress the dangers of accident and miscalculation. With 5000 weapons on hair-trigger alert, 30,000 Hiroshimas are an accident just waiting to happen. The subsequent exposure to high levels of radiation will affect our genetic make up and that of our children.
Nuclear weapons are irrelevant. The UK and France spend billions on a def fence system which we never intend to use and against an unknown enemy. There is also a perception that "the US looks after us". This is an view which could apply to all NATO states but does not get to the hub of the global anti-nuclear argument.
Nuclear weapons contradict our environmental concerns. We could paint a positive picture in which there were no atomic clouds, where we could relax with our favourite food, drink and music. We could live in a nuclear-free home in a nuclear-free world. We could positively promote a better way of living, highlighting the nuclear issue through choice, trade and consumption by favouring brands from nuclear-free countries or zones.
Nuclear Abolition needs leadership. Countries like the UK and France need to reassert a cultural and political identity independent of the US. If the UK renounced, or at least marginalised its nuclear weapons the pressure would be on France to follow. The next step would be a nuclear -free Europe which seized the moral high ground.
Nuclear Weapons contribute to global problems. American unilateralism and the Middle East situation are all to some extent underpinned by the existence of nuclear weapons. The "nuclear umbrella" is supported by a root system that undermines social and cultural structures.
Nuclear Weapons need to be identified for what they are. Unlike other issues, Nuclear Weapons are faceless, powerful and iconic. The majority of people don't have time or energy to engage at a deeper level. We find it difficult to resolve our acceptance of them. It seems that instinct recommends we accept them as a necessary evil of a power advantage even though it doesn't fit well with our personal values.
Nuclear weapons are not about security - they are about insecurity, doubt and fear. We need to unravel these deep-seated attitudes.
Nuclear Abolition can be a vote-winner. Several voting constituencies, such as the young, see politics as irrelevant to their lives. The challenge is to reach this powerful group by re-framing the nuclear weapons issue in the context of the environment, concerns about third world debt, and poverty, issues many of them are acutely aware of.
Nuclear Weapons are a bad habit. We don't need to ban the bomb instantly. We can give it up gradually. Small steps to reduce the threat of humanitarian and environmental catastrophe could include:
We want to take those weapons off alert...
Then we want to bring those weapons home...
Then we want to remove the warheads...
Then we want to dispose of them.
This is a logical pathway, easy to follow, just one step at a time . It is a process to remove the threat of mass destruction and radioactive wastelands from our future.
European Parliament, Plenary Debate on 11 February 2004, VERBATIM (language of origin)
Compromise final as negotiated in the afternoon of 17/2/2004-02-16
On Nuclear Disarmament: Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2005 - EU Preparation of third NPT Prepcom (New York, 26 April - 7 May 2004)
Tabled by Jan Marinus Wiersma - On behalf of the PSE Group
Tabled by Johan Van Hecke and Bob van den Bos - On behalf of the ELDR Group
Tabled by Jill Evans, Patricia McKenna, Nelly Maes, Caroline Lucas, Paul Lannoye and Elisabeth Schroedter - on behalf of the Green/EFA group
Tabled by Pernille Frahm - on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
Tabled by Philippe Morillon - on behalf of the PPE..
Evans, Jillian (Verts/ALE), Author. Mr President, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an agreement by 189 nations to eliminate nuclear weapons. However, 34 years after it entered into force, we are in a situation where the United States is willing to launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes, where the UK refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq, where research and development and the testing of nuclear weapons continue, where nuclear weapons are still considered a vital part of Nato defence planning, where new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons are developed and the nuclearisation of space is well under way.
In the last review conference in 2000 the 13-step plan was agreed as a way of implementing the NPT and it renewed the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear states to eliminate their weapons. The PrepCom in New York is the last chance to implement this programme before the next review conference in 2005. Unless we take a strong stand now, the NPT is in danger of becoming meaningless - full of good intentions, but resulting in little political action. The European Union has a duty to take a leading role in this and to ensure that real action is taken.
Nuclear weapons make the world more insecure and dangerous. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1996 that their use, or even their threatened use, was unlawful, which makes the strengthening of the NPT all the more urgent. We are talking here about real existing weapons of mass destruction and destroying them in the most effective way by enforcing international agreements.
We are asking the presidency, the Council and the Commission what exactly is being done in preparation for the PrepCom in New York. What progress has been made, for example, on the 13 practical steps and on nuclear-free zones? My country, Wales, declared itself nuclear-free in 1982. What is being done to support the pioneering work of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in mobilising cities throughout the world to work for the total abolition of nuclear weapons? This must be the goal of all of us.
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Mr President, it gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the presidency, to respond to the question that has been asked.
The European Union is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy incorporates and bases itself on the texts adopted by the European Council at Thessaloniki in June 2003.
The WMD strategy underlines the EUs particular commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT. The EU believes that all our efforts should be aimed at preserving and strengthening this fundamental instrument of international peace and security. The EU supports wholeheartedly the objectives laid down in the Treaty and is committed to the effective implementation of the final document of the 2000 NPT review conference and the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
The EU has repeatedly stated that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty. The EU statement to last years second preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, recalled that Member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of, and universal compliance with, the NPT. In this regard we welcome the accession to the Treaty by Cuba, in 2002, and by Timor Leste in 2003, which brings it closer to universality. However, there are three countries - India, Israel and Pakistan - that remain outside the regime and we continue to call upon them to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted a common position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Article 4 of the common position confirms that achieving universal adherence to the NPT is of crucial importance. To this end, the European Union will firstly call on those States not yet parties to the NPT to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non- nuclear-weapon states and to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under the provisions of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System.
Secondly, it will urge those states not yet having entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfil their obligations in accordance with Article III of the NPT and to conclude such agreements as a matter of urgency.
Thirdly, it will promote all the objectives laid down in the NPT.
Fourthly, it will support the final document of the 2000 NPT review conference and the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
Fifthly, it will promote further consideration of security assurances.
Finally, it will promote measures to ensure that any possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes will be effectively excluded.
There is no common Council analysis of the progress on the implementation of the 13 steps. The European Union is however committed to encouraging the progress made towards systematic and progressive efforts towards disarmament.
The European Union will continue to encourage all efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, as well as paragraphs 3 and 4c of the 1995 Declaration on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and the practical steps agreed in the 2000 final document.
The EUs commitment to the comprehensive test ban treaty is also clear and was reiterated most recently by the EU common position on the universalisation of multilateral instruments adopted in November 2003. The EU will continue to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. Pending its entry into force, we urge all states with nuclear capacity to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and refrain from any actions which are contrary to the CTBT.
The EU has acknowledged the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely achieved among the member states of the regions concerned. They enhance global and regional peace and security. We welcome and support both signature and ratification by the nuclear weapon states of the relevant protocols of nuclear- weapon-free zones.
On the question of verification and safeguards, the EU believes that the safeguards serve as a technical tool in support of the political goal of sustaining an environment in which there can be peaceful use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. In this connection we strongly support the verification role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Union also takes the view that adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguard agreements, and additional protocols to them, is a prerequisite in the effective and credible safeguards system.
The EU also continues to attach great importance to the fight against terrorism and strongly supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The WMD strategy emphasises the EUs commitment to strengthening export control policies and practices within its borders and beyond, in coordination with partners. The EU will work towards improving the existing export control mechanisms. It will advocate adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regime and arrangements including in the nuclear field.
As regards the proliferation security initiative, the Council has not adopted a position on this issue. Not all Member States participate in the PSI. The question of the International Mayors Campaign has not been considered by the Council.
The third preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will be held from 26 April to 7 May 2004, will be a pivotal event in terms of disarmament and non-proliferation in 2004. As presidency, we will work within the Union and with key partners, to seek agreement on a solid basis for the successful outcome of the review cycle. This work will take place in the first instance within the Working Group on Non-Proliferation and in its troika meetings with third countries. The work will include the preparation of EU common statements on various aspects of the Treaty for delivery by the presidency at the preparatory committee. The presidency will inform the European Parliament on the progress achieved in this field in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.
_ __ _
I welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate today although, inevitably, I will traverse some of the ground that has been so ably covered by the presidency.
Recent revelations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea have highlighted the importance of maintaining and strengthening effective controls. It is a matter of historic record that the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the 1990s and the consequent impact on regional stability gave rise to grave concern. North Koreas withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year was a further dangerous and destabilising step, both for the immediate region and the international community as a whole.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT - which entered into force in 1970, established the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as we know it. This regime established the basic norms for behaviour. It provides - as the House will know - a legal ban on nuclear proliferation beyond the five nuclear weapons states recognised by the Treaty and makes nuclear proliferation activity illegal in the international community. With it came the principle of regulated nuclear trade, the concept of nuclear safeguards and, of course, the International Atomic Energy Authority, whose excellent work underpins the regime.
Understandably, much of the focus has been on the regimes failures, but we often underestimate the success. In a 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy envisaged a world with perhaps 20 nations with a nuclear capability. That his vision was never realised has been due, in large part, to the creation of the NPT. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan andSouth Korea, for example, have all turned their backs on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, partly because of international pressure, but also as a result of sensible and wise decisions taken in response to domestic debate and opinion.
We also have positive recent developments with Iran, which has now accepted the Additional Protocol, and Libya. Against this background, while recognising the challenges that the NPT faces, particularly on nuclear proliferation and disarmament, we believe the forthcoming third preparatory committee can be approached with some confidence. There may well be shortcomings in the non-proliferation regime but they are certainly not terminal and they can, in our judgment, be addressed. We must continue to pursue the universal adoption of the NPT by countries that have so far refused to do so, and in particular India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea must return to conformity with the Treaty. We must also extend the ratification of the important Additional Protocol to the Treaty. This Protocol provides the IAEA with enhanced and tougher powers to perform inspections. In this context, the Commission's role is first in assisting the presidency, which sees progress in this area as a high priority, and second in encouraging the maximum degree of EU coordination.
The last 12 months have seen the EU take enormous strides in strengthening its approach to non-proliferation. The European security strategy that was adopted at the December 2003 European Council identifies weapons of mass destruction as one of the most dangerous threats to todays Europe. At the same European Council, the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was approved. This strategy is now being followed up by concrete action.
Work on implementation of the strategy is proceeding in a large number of areas which too numerous to set out today, but I will highlight a number of important examples.
The first was last Novembers adoption by the General Affairs and External Relations Council of a text aimed at mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the European Unions wider relations with third countries, among other things, by introducing a non-proliferation clause in agreements with them. This new commitment on non-proliferation is important, because the new EU strategy aims to include provisions on non-proliferation in all agreements with third countries. This is now part of ongoing negotiations, for example with Syria, placing non-proliferation on a similar level to human rights and the fight against terrorism.
The EU Joint Action for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Russia was established by the Council in 1999 to enhance cooperation with the Russian Federation in the latters pursuit of a safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement, destruction or conversion of those WMD infrastructures, equipment and materials. The projects support chemical destruction and the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. These projects, which are implemented by the Commission in close cooperation with a number of Member States, are a small but important part of the Communitys EUR 1 billion contribution to the G-8 Global Partnership, launched at the meeting in 2002 in Canada.
The Interparliamentary Conference hosted by the Commission under the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative on 20 and 21 November 2003, which took place here in Strasbourg, highlighted the considerable future challenges ahead if we are to safely dispose of the dangerous remains of Cold War WMD programmes. The conferences significance was confirmed through its status as an interparliamentary gathering of figures from key national parliaments,including the United States Congress and the Russian Duma. For the WMD threat to be removed it must become and remain a high priority issue for national governments, regional organisations and the international community as a whole.
From a Community perspective, we are grateful for the increased attention given by the European Parliament to the need to adequately fund threat-reduction activities in the next budget cycle. The Commission, in cooperation with the European Parliament, is seeking to define future non-proliferation priorities and, thanks to a recent decision by Parliament, will be able shortly to launch a pilot project to further this work.
I am grateful for the opportunity to have taken part in this short but important debate on a matter of such international significance.
McKenna (Verts/ALE). Mr President, the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom in New York in a few months' time has to be a success. To that end, it is essential that Ireland, as the holder of the presidency, ensures that Member States adopt a common position that will become part of its commitment to the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction adopted in Thessaloniki, because these are the ultimate weapons of mass destruction. Ireland, as one of the instigators of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has a major role to play here.
We would like to know, in relation to the Council Working Group on Nuclear Weapons, what the priorities are for the NPT PrepCom meeting. Parliament needs to know which Member States are being cooperative and which are not. The Council should prepare regular progress reports on this issue for Parliament, in particular on the issues of the dismantling of nuclear weapons arsenals, nuclear weapon-free zones and the no first-strike option. This is in the public interest. We need to know how far EU Member States have implemented the action programme of the 13 practical steps agreed in 2002
at the NPT Review Conference.
It is also very important that the Irish presidency takes a proactive role to ensure that Europe becomes a nuclear-free zone, that the UK and France get rid of their nuclear arsenals and that Nato's first-strike policy is abolished. The Council has to prepare a statement on the progress made by the EU since the report in 1995 by this Parliament on the NPT and, indeed, the many resolutions since then. I would like to see a proactive position from the Irish presidency, informing this Parliament about what is happening within the Council.
Lucas (Verts/ALE). Mr President, I do not share the optimism of either the Council or the Commission on this. The fact that two Member States of the European Union possess nuclear weapons undermines the moral authority of the whole of the EU when it comes to the debate on weapons of mass destruction.
The overwhelming hypocrisy of the British and American governments in demanding the disarmament of others, while simultaneously upgrading their own nuclear capacity, is clear for all to see. This is an untenable, hypocritical and very destabilising position. We have heard a lot about international law recently, so let me remind Britain and France that, according to the ICJ at The Hague, nuclear weapons are immoral and illegal. According to commitments made at the Sixth NPT Review Conference, all nuclear states made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. That was four years ago, and very little progress has been made since.
Britain and France should lead by example and unilaterally dismantle their nuclear warheads. There should be immediate removal of US nuclear weapons from European soil. These are undoubtedly ambitious aims, but if we are serious about the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, this is the route we have to take.
World Court Project: http://www.gn.apc.org/wcp
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Non-proliferation Treaty Review
Adjournment debate in UK Parliament
24* March 2004, 2 pm
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam): Order. We have no Hatttard reporter in the Chamber at present. However, the debate is being transcribed, so the position is not as bad as people might think.
Jercmy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab): I welcome the opportunity to introduce a debate on the non-proliferation treaty and its five-yearly review next year. The PrepCom will take place in April this year, I wish to declare an interest. I joined the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at the age of 16 and I have no plans to resign from it I do not recant anything that 1 have done within CND and I am a member of its national council I am proud to be a member. I thank the CND and the House of Commons Library for their help in preparing for the debate,
Last week, my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Llew Smith) initiated an interesting half-hour Adjournment debate on the acceptance or otherwise of nuclear weapons by the British Government The Undersecretary of State for Foreign and CommonwealuS Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr. Rammell), replied to the discussions. I shall set the debate in context we live in an incredibly dangerous world. Since 1945, there has been a huge number of wars. Many people have died as a result of those conflicts, yet we are still arming ourselves with nuclear weapons. While the purpose of roe NPT is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must recognise the heroic efforts of peace campaigners since nuclear weapons were first invented. People have bravely laid down their lives or devoted their whole lives to peace campaigns; such as me Nobel peace prize winner, Joseph Rotblat, who was part of the Manhattan project.
There are marry others, of course, such as the brave women of Greenham common who did so much to bring home to the world die dangers of die proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a hero, Mordecat Vammu, who is deserving of the Nobel peace prize and who is shortty to be released irona prison. He has spent 14 years in aa Israeli prison for having the temerity to tell the world that Israel was illegally developing nuclear weapons.
The case against nuclear weapons is strong. Each year., hi Tavistock square in Londonas in many other countries throughout the worldwe remember Hiroshima day. We commemorate what happened on 6 August 1945 when nuclear weapons were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a result of which 60,000 people died immediately. The effects of the cancers at that time are still with us and people are still dying as a result of those explosions. They were no more than fireworks compared with the nuclear weapons that are now available to us. We should reflect for a moment on what has been achieved since 1945 in respect of even more nuclear weapons and greater dangers.
In his speech on 16 March 2004, my hon. Friend die Member for Blaenau Gwent rightly quoted at column number 293 something that former President Jimmy Carter said about nuclear weapons. I shall repeat the quote because it is very apt The former President argued:
"In an all-out nuclear war, more destructive power than in all of World War II would be unleashed every second during the long afternoon it would take for all the missiles and bombs to fidl. A World War If every secondmore people killed in the first few hours than all die wars of history put together. The survivors, if any, would live in despair amid the poisoned ruins of a civilisation that had committed suicide.11
My hon. Friend also quoted former Soviet leader Khrushchev, who expressed similar sentiments when he said that
"the survivors would envy the dead,"
Before we go into the minutiae of treaty negotiations and the technicalities of the issue, we must reflect on why we are trying to achieve nuclear disarmament and why many people have dedicated their lives to that end the review conference in 2005 is important. It is the five-yearly review. When the Minister replies to the debate, 1 hope that he will give us some idea of what the Government's position will be and how he intends to involve Parliament in discussions about that so that MPs can make known their views on the matter.
The NPT review will take place as a result of the treaty that was first signed in 1970. It involved all the signatory states in the definition of what nuclear weapons were and in how they would get rid of them. The five declared nuclear weapon states undertook to get rid of their own nuclear weapons eventually. There was a commitment to total nuclear disarmament. That commitment remains, but it is a long way from being achieved.
1 will list the declared nuclear weapon states. The United States developed nuclear weapons during the Second World War in response to the true perception that Nazi Germany was also developing them, and it is the only country to explode them in anger. The Soviet Union followed by developing them in the immediate post-war period. Both the superpowers relied heavily in the development of their programmes on the expertise of Nazi weapons experts captured in 1945. Britain and France followed suit, but they developed smaller weapons. Then, dramatically, in 1964 China declared that it had nuclear weapons and exploded one.
The non-declared states that we know hold nuclear weapons are India, Pakistan and Israel. None of them has signed up to the NPT. That they should do so must remain a central demand of everyone involved in the peace movement. Another country that was well known to have nuclear weapons but was not a declared nuclear power was South Africa Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress have achieved many great things; we should thank them for revealing to the world the existence of South African nuclear weapons when they took power, and for renouncing their use and abolishing them. That allowed Africa to become a nuclear-free continent. We should remember that it is possible unilaterally to declare oneself to be nuclear disarmed and not to suffer immediate invasion from somewhere else.
Mr. Simon Thomas (Ceredigion) (PC): Does die hon. Gentleman agree that it would be useful if today or in the near future the Government were to make clear their intention not to continue with Trident when it reaches the end of its natural life? That would be a huge step forward in ensuring that the treaty becomes workable and effective throughout the world.
Jeremy Corbyn : 1 agree. I was going to mention Trident later.
The other countries that are believed to have nuclear weaponsor, at least, me capability of developing than are Iran, Libya and North Korea. However, it is conceivable that most countries that have access to nuclear power could, in the right circumstances, develop nuclear weapons as well, although considerable technological knowledge would be required to achieve that.
We have NPTs and bans on the export of nuclear material and the technology that goes with it, but the limitations of all of that have been exposed by the statements of Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan, who told the world about the large quantities of nuclear material that he had been involved in exporting to North Korea and other countries and the danger that goes with that
So far, 188 have signed up to the NPT. The latest three to join are Cuba and East Timor. The only three states that remain outside the NPT process are India, Israel and Pakistan. I appeal to the Government to do everything that they can to persuade those countries to sign up to the NPT and to accept mat the world must get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. If we are serious about persuading them to nuclear disarm, we should question why we are providing them with such a vast amount of conventional arms, which can be used in a localised war between India and Pakistan, and in the case of Israel can be, and are, used against the Palestinian people in the continued occupation of Palestine. The 2000 review agreed on 13 steps, all of which led towards a nuclear-free world, but the associated comprehensive test ban treaty has been signed by only 180 countries. Twenty-one countries have not signed it. I urge the Government to do everything that they can to persuade those countries to sign the treaty.
We should remember that the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons that took place routinely during the 1950s and early 1960s caused enormous environmental damage throughout the Pacific and in Australia. People, including British soldiers, are still dying who are nuclear test veterans. That is the reality of nuclear weapons and explosions.
In The Economist in October 2003, Muhammed El Baradei. me UN nuclear weapons expert, wrote an interesting and long article called "Towards a safer world" as head of the UN's investigation team. 1 shall quote briefly from it. He wrote that
"controlling access to nuclear-weapons technology has grown increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to designing weapons and to mastering the processing steps have eroded with time... Uranium enrichment is sophisticated and expensive, but it is not proscribed under the NPT. Most designs for civilian nuclear-power reactors require fuel mat has been low-enriched', and many research reactors operate with "high-enriched1 uranium. It is not uncommon, therefore, for non-nuclear-weapon states with developed nuclear infrastructures to seek enrichment capabilities and to possess sizeable amounts of uranium that could, if desired, be enriched to weapons-grade."
"In 1970, it was assumed that relatively few countries knew how to acquire nuclear weapons. Now, with 35 to 40 countries in the know by some estimates, the margin of security under the current non-proliferation regime is becoming too slim for comfort."
He calls for a new approach and gives three proposals. The first is
"to limit the processing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes, as well as die production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment."
His other two proposals are that"nuclear-energy systems should be deployed mat, by design, avoid the use of materials that may be applied directly to making nuclear weapons" and that
"We should consider multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. More than 50 countries have spent fuel stored in temporary sites, waiting processing or disposal. Not all countries have the right geology to store waste underground and, for many countries with small nuclear programmes for electricity generation or for research,"the cost of facilities is prohibitive. By bringing his considerable expertise to bear on the subject, he has pointed out some of the technical problems and limitations mat one hopes that the NPT review conference will address.
The British Government will be participating in die PrepCom in April and May 2004 and in die full review conference next year. There are a number of issues that die British Government must address and I hope that we can discuss them briefly this afternoon. The first issue is that, if we are serious about nuclear disarmament, we must say that we are not prepared to use nuclear weapons. However, me Secretary of State for Defence made a number of statements throughout die run up to die Iraq war and sincewhich were repeated by die Minister last week in a debate in die Housemat die British Government would not rule out die use of nuclear weapons. I find it inconceivable that this country would ever use nuclear weapons. I want to hear die Minister say mat, so that we can declare ourselves serious about disarmament and die non-use of nuclear weapons. I know that a number of facilities have been taken out of use and a number of submarines taken off patrol and mat me number of active nuclear warheads is much reduced. Nevertheless, it takes only one warhead to go off to set off a nuclear conflict.
The second issue is die proliferation of nuclear weapons, which I believe is part and parcel of die US proposals for national missile defence, and Britain's signing up to die initial part of the NMD process. If we are to lecture nierest of die world on die need for nuclear disarmament, it ill behoves us to develop national missile defence, given die danger of proliferation.
The third issue is die one raised by my friend, the hon. Member for Ceredigion (Mr. Thomas), in his intervention concerning die replacement for Trident, which is becoming more or less obsolete, as did Polaris before that. It would be nice to hear dial there are no plans to replace that nuclear facility, and that we are committed to die statement to which we readily signed up in 1970 for die eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
There is also die question of rigorous inspections in Iran, Korea and Libya Although such inspections are taking place in Libya and, to some extent, Iran, and although negotiations are going on in Korea, one hopes that die NPT conference will be an opportunity to ensure effective inspections. As I pointed out, we should also continue to put pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to rid themselves of nuclear weapons.
In 2000, my old friend, die sadly recently deceased Lord Jenkins of Putney, asked in die House of Lords whether the Government were
"hoping to make substantial progress towards world nuclear disarmament at me coming United Nations NPT Review Conference in New York" that is, PrepCom "and how they propose to avoid me procedural discussions which are reported to have nullified the recent Geneva Conference."
That was four years ago. In reply, die Minister said:
"We are looking for die conference to result in a balanced review which takes account of die positive steps which both we and other nuclear weapon states have taken over die past five years and which also sets a realistic agenda for die next five years." [Official Report, House of Lords, 28 February 2000; Vol. 610, c. 323 and 324.]
Those are nice words well put, but unfortunately the problem remains that that conference, although important in itself, did not achieve the breakthrough wanted. One hopes that there will be a breakthrough in Hie conference this April and May.
I hope that the Minister will answer the points that Iand, no doubt, other hon. Memberswill raise this afternoon concerning the existence and use of nuclear weapons and, above all, the possibility of nuclear disarmament that comes from the NPT process. 1 also hope that he will seriously consult with the many bodies of opinion and expertise in this country, including those in the peace movement and various defence analysts and experts, so that there is popular understanding of what the NPT process is about, and of the possibility of our achieving nuclear disarmament.
The 1970 treaty envisaged that all states would eventually rid themselves completely of all nuclear weapons. In 1998, at the United Nations, the "new agenda" coalition of countriesBrazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Swedenproposed that we should get rid of all nuclear weapons, and saw that as a way forward. Why did the United Kingdom vote against die resolution put by those very honorable countries, all of which were very clearly saying something about nuclear weapons? Why was the opportunity of the 1998 strategic defence review not used to allow us to go a little bit further than we did in reducing the number of nuclear weapons on patrol? Why did we not use that opportunity to try to bring about the aspirations of the 1970 treaty?
I concludeso that others may speakby saying that the world has the ability to destroy itself many times over. Many people are dying because of conventional weapons, and many more would die if nuclear weapons were used. Many countries want to get hold of nuclear weapons because they see that the five permanent members of the Security Council are members of the nuclear club, and are the people with the power, deciding how the world is run. If the example is set by those five powers, who are expanding their nuclear capability through national missile defence, or a regeneration of Trident, or whatever, that does not make the world a safer place; in fact, it makes it infinitely more dangerous. The non-proliferation treaty debatethe conference next yearis an opportunity to step towards peace and use our skill, expertise and wealth for peaceful purposes, rather than for the development of weapons of mass destruction, which we hold in this country.
I have been in the CND all my life, and I am in a party with my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent, who has met many Members who are very committed to nuclear disarmament. This is a live issue in political debate, and I hope that today's debate goes some way towards encouraging further public discussion, with the hope and aspiration that there can be a world completely rid of nuclear weapons and their consequences.
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Richard Norton Taylor Guardians security of affairs editors, comments on Britains nuclear arsenal
Today anti-nuclear campaigners begin their traditional Easter march from Trafalgar Square to the quaintly named Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire. Up to now, governments Labour and Tory alike have brushed it aside as a benign ritual, to be patronised or scorned. The point of the march cannot be dismissed so easily for much longer.
The traditional notion of nuclear deterrence is being challenged as never before as Washington embraces the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. That is why such conservative adherents of deterrence 'theory as Henry Kissinger and Sir Michael Quinlan, former top nuclear apologist at the Ministry of Defence, were so opposed to the invasion of Iraq. (Deterrence wasn't given a chance.)
The Bush administration is coming under growing pressure from elements in the defence establishment to develop "mini-nukes". In a little-noticed report recently obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, the Pentagon's advisory Defence Science Board said the US should invest in low-yield nukes. These, it says, would be much more credible, since they would create less radioactive fallout than existing weapons.
"The United States is moving away from the high-yield city-obliterators of the cold war and seeks to develop smaller, tactical, nuclear weapons, such as deep penetrating bunker busters or mini-nukes, which are regarded as more flexible and usable," says Rebecca Johnson, director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.
At Aldermaston, a £2bn-plus investment programme is under way on a project that would enable Britain to produce a new generation of nuclear weapons. A spokesman for the plant told the Guardian, when it was first disclosed two years ago, that the huge expansion plan would provide scientists with the capability to design and produce "mini-nukes" or nuclear warheads for cruise missiles.
Paul Rogers of Bradford University echoes the point. "The usability idea is increasing markedly, the deterrence idea is decreasing markedly," he says. "We are on a slippery slope.
In the run-up to the Iraq invasion, Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, said: "I am absolutely confident, in the right conditions, we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons." He insisted that the government "reserved the right" to use nuclear weapons if 'Britain or its troops were threatened by chemical or biological weapons. We were being told for the first time that a UK government would be prepared to launch a nuclear first-strike against a non-nuclear state.
The government's official line on why we need nukes was spelt out in the MoD's defence white paper published in December. It says that the "continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security".
After repeating the claim that nuclear weapons are the "ultimate guarantor of the UK's national security", it adds: "Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed [in] this parliament but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point."
If the decision has to be taken in the next parliament, then in its next manifesto
'The US is moving away from city obliterators, to bunker busters or mini-nukes'
Labour will have to say what it intends to do with pur nuclear weapons and why. The white paper referred to options for "maintaining" .such weapons, not abandoning them.
Yet what's the point of keeping them now that the notion of deterrence has been abandoned? That has been confirmed by those in Washington and London who advocate pre-emptive strikes against potential enemies. But they admit "rogue states" and terrorist groups would not be deterred by the threat of nuclear attack, however small or "clean" the weapon.
In which case, what is the point of Britain clinging on to an ageing nuclear ballistic missile system, which is entirely dependent on the US? Military commanders with their feet on the ground say there is little point, since whatever credibility might
have been given to deterrence theory in the cold war, it is no longer valid as ministers themselves appear to admit. Thus the only point in having them is to use them.
Despite Hoon's comments, that a Blair government would actually fire a Trident missile with a nuclear warhead does seem incredible. The only point in keeping the system, military sources say, is political ministers want to be on the "top table" and, anyway, the French won't give up their nukes.
Either way, to abandon Trident, or replace it, is a huge decision, to be faced up to in parliament and in the country at large as well as on the road to Aldermaston.
Richard Norton-Taylor is the Guardian's security affairs editor
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Themes from 2003 PrepCom Geneva
1) Creation of subsidiary intercessions nuclear disarmament body (Mexico)
2) Standard reporting requirements (Canada, Mexico)
3) Security Council meeting (France and Germany)
4) Meeting of states parties re: S. Hemisphere NWFZ (Malaysia, Non-Aligned Movement)
5) Emergency response procedure (Germany)
6) NGO access/ participation (Canada)
7) Tactical nuke focus (New Agenda Coalition, Austria)
8) NPT secretariat (Possibility being talked about for next year)
9) Negative Security Assurances (New Agenda Coalition/ all)
10)Kofi Annan's Millennium Call for a Conference to Eliminate Nuclear Dangers (New Agenda Coalition)
11) Peaceful uses as carrot (China)
12) G8WMD statement
13) Disarm & Nonproliferation education study (next week)
14) Disarm and nonproliferation as mutually supportive (Many)
15) NPT and CD
16) Funding on NPT process by states parties - impact on states participation
17) Inspections and IAEA additional protocol (Germany)
18) 13 Step Compliance and differing views on level
19)Pullback from unequivocal undertaking
20) Mid East NWFZ
21)Nuclear Weapons convention Framework
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Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) 2003 PrepCom Update
NPT PrepCom welcomes Cuba and Timor Leste
Concerned about Slow Pace of Nuclear Disarmament
Slow progress towards nuclear disarmament was on the minds of many delegates at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT PrepCom). The PrepCom's first two sessions sought to consider principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.The Committee devoted most of its work to discussions on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and international security, nuclear-weapon-free zones and safeguards; and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes. Time was also allotted for consideration of the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference on the Middle East and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.
Special attention was also given to negative security assurances. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had requested that the Preparatory Committee make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on the subject.Reports by States parties increase
With regard to reporting on the implementation of Article VI and principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", 28 reports were submitted to the second session, compared to 11 reports received at the first session. Discussions continued on the nature and modalities of reporting.
Further to a request by States parties, the Chairman, Laszlo Molnar of Hungary, raised the notion of initiating increased interaction among States parties through spontaneous dialogue outside the formal presentation of statements. The Committee concluded with the adoption of a report on its work that included the Chairman's summary.
Representatives from 106 States parties participated in the work of the second session. Following its accession to the Treaty in November 2002, Cuba participated in the Committee's work for the first time as a State party. States parties also welcomed the accession to the Treaty by Timor Leste, which had celebrated its independence on 20 May 2002.
The third session of the Preparatory Committee will be held from 26 April to 7 May 2004 in New York. At that session, the Preparatory Committee is mandated to make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Pursuant to an agreement reached at the first session, the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty will nominate a candidate for the chairmanship of the third session.
Civil society participation
A total of 152 representatives from 37 NGOs attended the second session as observers. On 30 April, a meeting was devoted to 11 presentations by NGO representatives.
A working paper was presented by Canada, acknowledging the role of NGOs in supporting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and stressing the relevance of increased NGO participation in the NPT Review Conferences and their preparatory processes. The paper lays out options on how NGO participation in the NPT review process could be made more effective and beneficial to the process. Options include intervention in plenary meetings and cluster debates; timely access to all official documentation; joint sponsorship of consultations, dialogues, panel discussions and briefings with the Conference Secretariat, DDA and States parties; and inclusion of NGO advisors in national delegations.
A working paper presented by Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden addressed the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation education. The paper stressed that the Preparatory Committee should encourage Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations to include information on the NPT in their education and training programmes, including the outcome of the NPT Review Conferences and the work by States parties to implement the Treaty. The co-sponsors will present a more detailed working paper on the issue at the PrepCom's third session.
For further information, on weapons of mass destruction, see disarmament.un.org
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Senator Douglas Roche, Q.C. Chairmen Middle Power Initiative, Report and assessment of the 2003 NPT
Because it had to appeal to all delegations, the Chairman's Factual Summary, negotiated among delegations in private meetings, was bland and certainly not a ringing call to action. The governments are so deeply divided on the issue of nuclear weapons that it would be unrealistic to think that problems which extend beyond the NPT itself can be resolved by the limited authority of a PrepCom. The issue of compliance with the NPT is less one of technical considerations and more one of the philosophy of power. The five permanent members of the Security Council exercise a hegemony over the rest of the world through their power, which is sustained by their possession of nuclear weapons. If they were sincere about living up to the fundamental bargain of the NPT, they would have acted - in a joint and collaborative manner - to shut down the nuclear weapons enterprises that they foster. They have had plenty of time to do this. And they have been given many citations for action, not least by the International Court of Justice.
Now the non-proliferation regime is further threatened by the emergence of a new ideology aimed at disbanding arms control and disarmament treaties. The ABM and the CTBT are but two examples. The diminishment of the qualitative value of the 13 Practical Steps undermines the protestations of an "unequivocal undertaking" to total elimination. The NPT is thus in a shaky state today, but it can only be strengthened by outside forces. The call for U.N. Security Council action at the Summit level maybe a start, even if such a meeting were to begin with only a limited interpretation of what "non-proliferation" truly means. At least the discussion would be lifted out of the ritual of the NPT process. Left to itself in the present atmosphere, the NPT will fall apart. It simply cannot hold together in one compact two such divisive views and sets of actors. If the atmosphere were to change, then the NPT could make genuine progress because it has already shown a tremendous capacity for handling all the technical questions contained within the drive for nuclear disarmament. In the end, the fundamental question - do nations want to achieve nuclear disarmament - can only be answered by the governments concerned.
Here the question of public opinion, as Dhanapala has repeatedly said, will be a determining factor. Will the publics manifest to their political leaders their aversion to nuclear weapons, and make governments respond to deeply held feelings of the immorality, illegality and sheer danger of the continued possession of nuclear weapons? The answer to that question is uncertain. Though publics around the world manifested their aversion to war in the runup to the 2003 Iraq war, they have been largely silent on the nuclear weapons issue. While public opinion polls have shown that people generally would like to get rid of nuclear weapons, there has not been a vibrant expression of that opinion. It lies rather flat and flabby in the list of public concerns. There are so many crises in the world that the nuclear weapons issue seems remote. Even educators seem perplexed by the immensity of the issue.
Yet the world is inexorably moving to some form of nuclear warfare. That this should be happening in what has been termed the "Post-Cold War" era is a paradox of immense consequences. The questions of political power and the rule of law must be addressed if the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to play its part in world safety. These questions are essentially moral ones. People do understand moral issues. When they understand the moral consequences of present trendlines, they will not put up with the ritualistic fagade that the NPT review process has become.
Senator Roche'sfull report is on http//www.web.net/~cnanw/droche.pdf
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"Rouges and Rhetoric: the 2003 NPT PrepCom Slides Backwards"
Rebecca Johnson of The Acronym Institute's Report of the 2003 NPT PrepCom
From being added as a "good faith' article at the insistence of NNWS at the height of the Cold War arms racing in 1968, nuclear disarmament came to look practically achievable during the 1990s. As a consequence, the post-Cold War period saw a number of parallel initiatives to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, discredit and diminish their role in defense and deterrence, and determine the steps that would bring the world closer to nuclear disarmament. In the context of the NPT, these initiatives culminated in consensus agreement on a substantive final document at the 2000 Review Conference, Just three years later, the 2003 PrepCom made those strategies and aspirations look like a world away.
In its heavy focus on preventing horizontal proliferation, this PrepCom seemed a flashback from the past. The question is: how much of this is due solely to the Bush Administration's neo-conservative agenda, and how much of the shift in priority and emphasis represents a new, post-9/11 trend?
The war on Iraq has raised far more questions than it has answered about pre-emptive military action to prevent proliferation. With hindsight, public reluctance to be bounced into war again on the basis of hyped threats and misused intelligence may also serve to reinstate the value of strengthened multilateral institutions, inspections and verification (not forgetting the important contributions from dissidents and whistle blowers) as mechanisms for investigation and containment.
In view of the dangers inherent in a link between terrorism and the acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, the return-to-the-past focus on non-compliance and proliferation is understandable. But the other arm of this policy push - the downgrading of disarmament - is very dangerous. While the US focused on non-compliance, Iran and the DPRK, another central theme of this PrepCom was concern about the intentions and plans of the Bush administration, Though many presentations were muted, the corridor conversations revealed deep concerns, from US allies as much as from the more marginalised countries. Concerns centered around the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy, and various strident statements by administration officials and Republican representatives regarding nuclear weapons use, doctrine, and the need for new, more flexible nuclear weapons, raising the specter of a resumption of nuclear testing, and the collapse of the CTBT and NPT regimes in the future.
The particular conditions of the Cold War, with its nuclear policy justifications that based security on balancing terror, vulnerability and mutual assured destruction, and its de facto exemptions for the major nuclear powers, will not return. We are faced with a much more complex mix of objectives, reactions and potential or actual capabilities. Iran, it would seems is more likely (at least for the time being) to follow Japan's example than Iraq's; to use Article IV to develop 'insurance policy1 capabilities amounting to virtual deterrence, rather than a clandestine nuclear weapons production programme in clear violation of the NPT. However unconvincing the civilian nuclear energy and space launch justifications might appear, with good reason, we cannot base non-proliferation policies on whether a country is regarded as friend or foe -particularly as such an assessment may shift and swing with the political winds. The problem with the insurance analogy is that one pays insurance premiums year by year so that the policy can be activated to provide financial protection or help if needed. Activating nuclear weapons, however, provides not help or compensation but widespread death and destruction. If Iran pursues this path, it must expect to be haunted by its own words of abhorrence.
Iran's strategy, likely to be followed by others, should force the world to address the potentially fatal Achilles heel in the nonproliferation regime. Long opposed by anti-nuclear activists, the historical commitment to nuclear energy enshrined in Article IV continues to be the primary route to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities. As long as the acquire does not seek to weaponise, there is little the regime can do but - as the United States showed at this meeting - toss around accusations and innuendo. Does proliferation then become a question of weaponisation? Are we going to see more and more countries prepared to make the heavy investment in unnecessary nuclear power in order to give themselves as virtual deterrent for the future? Since, as India and Pakistan have shown, virtual deterrents can be weaponised fairly quickly, such a scenario would be profoundly destabilising of regional and international security.
If this is the case, as many believe, then the United States is making some big mistakes in how it tries to address the serious proliferation challenges confronting the world. Its actions now may in fact be provoking the nuclear threats of the future.
Times are changing, but the NPT regime appears to be slipping backwards, not adapting to consolidate the post Cold War gains and move forward. Its focus is narrowing at the very time it needs to grow. To retain respect and utility as an important tool of non-proliferation and disarmament, a serious overhaul, in four fundamental areas, is now required:
Reduce incentives to acquire nuclear technology and weapons: The NWS must stop treating nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, which means that nuclear disarmament must be restored at the heart of the non-proliferation regime; and the problematic contradiction of Article IV's promotion of nuclear fuel will finally have to be dealt with,
Address the security concerns of potential proliferators and their neighbors. Giving rather different meaning to pre-emption and preventive action than the military strikes envisaged in neo-conservative doctrine, this should be done proactively, as a matter of course, not just in reaction to nuclear threat or blackmail (which tends to reinforce proliferation incentives).
Restore the credibility and effectiveness of arms control and the international rule of law. When
powerful governments engage in negotiations and then cherry pick the bits they like, they undermine the regime as a whole and steal security from
Increase verification and enforcement powers:
Start by making the Additional Protocol mandatory,
Finally, the strengths as well as the limitations of the 2003 PrepCom, as with its predecessor, are making it ever clearer that the NPT review process is inadequate to the task of dealing with the kinds of proliferation challenges now threatening international security. It was encouraging to see serious consideration being given to different structural and organisational approaches. While the BWC model and the emergency response mechanism are both interesting, neither would be sufficient. The treaty has passed the need for an enhanced review process; it needs a structure and mechanism for states parties to take responsibility for implementation and enforcement of its obligations. What this should be, may be the most important question that the 2005 Review Conference has to decide.
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IPPNW Campaign for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Century: NPT PrepCom
By John Loretz, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
www.ippnw.org The International Physicians Campaign
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, dangerous enough on its own terms because of the history of armed conflict between those two countries, marked the beginning of a new era of global proliferation that threatens to accelerate out of control. North Korea and Iran are the states of greatest immediate concern, but others are sure to follow. The possibility that terrorists will obtain a nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersion bomb (a "crude nuclear weapon") from one of these new nuclear states or from the inadequately secured stockpiles of the former Soviet Union cannot be ruled out.
The nuclear weapons and nuclear policies of the United States, of course, continue to dominate the beginning of the 21st century. Despite the end of the Cold War between the US and the former Soviet Union more than a decade ago, the US government has reaffirmed its intention to rely upon nuclear weapons for national security. The Nuclear Posture Review, the US National Security Strategy, Bush administration military budget requests, and a range of related policy documents reveal plans for new generations of nuclear weapons as well as accelerated development of missile defense and military outer space technologies. These stubborn assertions of a permanent national right to possess nuclear weapons and to maintain a strategic and operational role for them far into the future directly contradicts US disarmament obligations under the NPT and subsequent commitments emerging from NPT Reviews. The US attitude also exacerbates a nuclear double standard that is fueling both vertical and horizontal proliferation.This proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, the possibility of nuclear terrorism, and the erosion of the treaty frameworks that have slowed the spread of nuclear weapons have created new dangers and new obstacles to the goal of disarmament.
Having arrived at this crossroads, the NGO community, including IPPNW, has decided to use the time between now and the 2005 NPT Review Conference to organize the largest, most dramatic show of public support possible for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. IPPNWs Campaign For a Nuclear-Weapons-Free 21st Century has two overriding goals:
In addition to expanding the Dialogues With Decision Makers program to include as many affiliates as possible in a global disarmament advocacy effort, IPPNW affiliates in NATO countries will engage in a coordinated campaign to raise public and governmental awareness regarding the contradictions between NATO nuclear policies and national disarmament obligations under the NPT. This part of the campaign will focus on four specific policy demands: that NATO member states facilitate entry into force of the CTBT and inform the US that a nuclear test would be unacceptable to the rest of the alliance; adoption of an unconditional no-first-use policy for NATO; permanent withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from all non-nuclear NATO member states; and an end to NATOs nuclear sharing policy.
Other elements of the campaign will include outreach to the recently formed Blix Commission on weapons of mass destruction, support for the Mayors for Peace initiative to bring a civil-society-sponsored disarmament resolution to the 2005 NPT PrepCom, and international activities that can insert a broader global perspective into the US policy debate on security, military spending, and disarmament.
IPPNW aims to play a major role at the final Preparatory Committee meeting before the all-important 2005 NPT Review, with a presentation on the "human face" of the nuclear threat. According to IPPNW President Ron McCoy:
"We know what almost 60 years under the nuclear shadow have done to the hundreds of thousands of victims, whether they be hibakusha, downwinders, nuclear industry workers, or communities in the Global South and elsewhere who have been deprived of true health and security because of the enormous amount of resources squandered on acquiring, testing, and developing nuclear weapons. In a more general sense, we are all victims of the preparations for nuclear war, because we are all held hostage to the ever present threat of extinction."
Elaborating on US intentions to manufacture a new generation of nuclear weapons, including nuclear "bunker busters" that could be used against suspected underground chemical and biological weapons facilities, Dr. McCoy writes:
"To categorize nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons together under the single rubric weapons of mass destruction, without making fundamental distinctions regarding the scales of destructive effect, betrays a lack of understanding. To do so for the political purpose of defining uses for nuclear weapons against chemical and biological threats for example, nuclear-armed bunker busters designed to destroy underground chemical or biological weapons facilities or to threaten nuclear retaliation against a chemical or biological attack, is a cynical betrayal of the global responsibility to ensure that these weapons are never used again."
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Ideas for presentation for 2004 Prep-com and review conference 2005
Presentation topic food for thought for PrepCom 2004 and review conference
what topics are most urgent and politically sawy to cover & who will convene them? - these could include: ngo access, new nukes, comprehensive test ban treaty organization access, international atomic energy agency roles & responsibilities, vertical proliferation, non-nuclear weapons states as a superpower, citizens inspections as a verification measure- transparency, accountability, shadow reports as a standardized reporting mechanism, de-alerting, recalling of weapons stored on foreign soil, targeting, missiles, article IV- what other "carrots"?, nuclear weapons convention, SSOD, Conference on disarm, military staff committee, counter, non and vertical proliferation.
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that die benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between the States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency s safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peacefuluses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. ForStates depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties -which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragrapn 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized it supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty, DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.
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13 Practical steps
EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995
Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on / Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
* Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
* Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
* The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
* Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
* A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
* The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
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We will close the NPT dossier with the end part of a speech delivered on April 30, 2003, before the delegates at the NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting at UN Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland by Tadatoshi Akiba, mayor of Hiroshima and president of the Mayors for Peace.
"...To summarize, we demand here and now that, when the States Parties review the NPT in 2005, you take that opportunity to pass by majority vote, regardless of any nations that may oppose it, a call for the immediate de-alerting of all nuclear weapons, for unequivocal action toward dismantling and destroying all nuclear weapons in accordance with a clearly stipulated timetable, and for negotiations on a universal Nuclear Weapons Convention establishing a verifiable and irreversible regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 'Impossible,' some will say. "The nuclear powers will never agree.' But just as plants can get along fine without human beings, people are ultimately the power behind their leaders. The time has come for the people to arise and let our militarist, competitivist leaders know where the real power lies. The time has come to go beyond words, reason and non-binding treaties. The time has come to impose economic sanctions on any nation that insists on maintaining nuclear weapons. The time has come to use demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts, and every nonviolent means at our disposal to oppose the destruction of millions of our brothers and sisters, the destruction of our habitat and the extermination of our species. The time has come to fight, nonviolently, for our lives."
"All of us in this room today, blessed with extremely high levels of prosperity and education, are duty-bound to educate the rest of the population in our countries about the nuclear danger. We must inform them and mobilize them for their own protection. It is our responsibility to launch a massive, grassroots campaign that will make it clear that the people of all nations will accept only leaders who undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear weapons.
"The military industrial complex is too powerful,' some will say. I have no illusions about what happens when the people seek to correct their rulers. It took a hundred years and a terribly bloody war to free the slaves in the US, then another century to free them from the terror of lynchings and the humiliation of segregation. It took 30 years for Gandhi to free India from British rule. It took 15 years to stop the Vietnam War. Bottom-up change takes time and great sacrifice, but, unfortunately, people of moral and spiritual vision must again take up the struggle. The abolition of nuclear weapons is no less important and no less just than the abolition of slavery. We are not just fighting a technology or a weapon. As Martin Luther King Jr. said, we are fighting nuclear weapons in our own minds. We are fighting the very idea that anyone could, for any reason, unleash a nuclear holocaust. We are fighting the idea that a small group of powerful men should have the capacity to launch Armageddon. We are fighting the idea that we should spend trillions of dollars on military overkill while billions of us live in dire, life-threatening poverty.
Our immediate target is nuclear weapons, but our long-term aim is a new world order. In this new world, no man is foolish enough to kill or be killed to defend his master's wealth or ego. We seek a world in which no man, woman or child goes to bed wondering whether he or she will live through the hunger, pestilence, or violence of the next day; a world in which we look around this room and see not murdering, thieving enemies against whom we have to defend ourselves but brothers and sisters on whom our own safety, security, survival and enjoyment depend.
You will soon be hearing about a new campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, supported by the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, which represents 555 cities and over 250 million people around the world, will work with anyone willing to help design, develop, and implement this campaign. Please join us. Please support the campaign in any way you can. Let us work together for the sake of our children and grandchildren. Let us ban nuclear weapons in 2005."
For further information on NPT Dossier please contact:
Vice-Chairman: Action for United Nations Renewal
Secretary: London CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)
Editor: INLAP TIME (Institute for Law & Peace)
Founder Member: Non Violent Action Monthly Magazine
14 CAVELL STREET, LONDON E1 2HP (U.K.)
TEL: 020 7790 4090 / 020 7702 7633 MOBILE: 07776 231018
FAX: 020 7702 7264 Email: email@example.com
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Links for more information
World Information Service on Energy -- http://www.antenna.nl/wise/beyondbomb/index.html-- A summary of a book based on a series of five international seminars in spring 1995
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